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__________ 
 
OPINION OF THE COURT 
__________ 
 
ALDISERT, Circuit Judge. 
 
David W. Covell and Margaret Covell, who are 
plenary guardians of their adult son David F. Covell, appeal 
from a jury‟s verdict for the defendant in their products 
liability suit against Easton-Bell Sports, Inc. They urge us to 
order a new trial on the ground that the District Court erred 
by admitting evidence and charging the jury pursuant to 
sections 1 and 2 of the Restatement (Third) of Torts (1998), 
4 
rather than section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts 
(1965). Having held in Berrier v. Simplicity Manufacturing, 
Inc., 563 F.3d 38 (3d Cir. 2009), cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 553 
(2009), that federal district courts applying Pennsylvania law 
to products liability cases should look to sections 1 and 2 of 
the Restatement (Third) of Torts, and seeing no reason to 
reverse course now, we will affirm. 
 
I. 
 
David F. Covell, a 36 year-old schoolteacher, 
sustained serious brain injuries when he was struck by a car 
while bicycling to work in 2007. Tragically, he is now so 
disabled that his parents (the “Covells”) have been appointed 
his legal guardians. In that capacity, they filed this products 
liability suit against Easton-Bell Sports, Inc. (“Bell”), which 
manufactured the “Giro Monza” bicycle helmet their son 
wore during the collision. Their suit, filed in the Pennsylvania 
Court of Common Pleas, alleged that the Giro Monza helmet 
was defectively designed and that it lacked adequate warnings 
about danger from impact to the helmet‟s edge. Bell removed 
the case to the United States District Court for the Eastern 
District of Pennsylvania, where the trial proceeded according 
to Pennsylvania substantive law. 
 
At trial, and over the Covells‟ strident objections, the 
District Court permitted Bell to introduce expert testimony 
that was based in part upon the United States Consumer 
Product Safety Commission‟s Safety Standard for Bicycle 
Helmets (the “CPSC Standard”). The CPSC Standard is an 
administrative regulation that provides an exacting set of 
guidelines for impact resistance, head covering, labels on 
helmets and helmet boxes, helmet resistance to temperature 
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and moisture, manufacturer recordkeeping, and much more. 
See 16 C.F.R. § 1203. Forced to respond to Bell‟s expert, the 
Covells offered their own expert testimony regarding the 
CPSC Standard. Ultimately, experts for both sides agreed that 
the CPSC Standard forms the starting point for any bicycle 
helmet design, and that the Giro Monza helmet satisfied the 
CPSC Standard in all respects. 
 
At the trial‟s conclusion, the District Court instructed 
the jury pursuant to sections 1 and 2 of the Restatement 
(Third) of Torts. The Court also instructed the jury that, in 
determining whether the Giro Monza helmet was or was not 
defective, it could consider evidence of standards or customs 
in the bicycle helmet industry, including the CPSC Standard. 
The jury returned a verdict for the defense, finding that the 
helmet was not defective. The Covells timely filed this 
appeal. 
 
II. 
 
The District Court had diversity jurisdiction pursuant 
to 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(1). We have jurisdiction pursuant to 
28 U.S.C. § 1291. 
 
We review issues of law de novo. Bear Mt. Orchards, 
Inc. v. Mich-Kim, Inc., 623 F.3d 163, 169 (3d Cir. 2010). 
This includes a District Court‟s decision to admit or exclude 
evidence pursuant to Pennsylvania law. Dillinger v. 
Caterpillar, Inc., 959 F.2d 430, 434-435 (3d Cir. 1992). 
 
III. 
 
The Covells call to our attention two assignments of 
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error. First, they contend that the District Court should not 
have applied the Restatement (Third) of Torts when 
instructing the jury and when admitting evidence of the CPSC 
Standard. Second, they contend that even if it was proper to 
apply the Restatement (Third) of Torts, the CPSC Standard 
was nonetheless inadmissible. We disagree and will affirm 
the District Court on both counts. 
 
A. 
 
We begin with the District Court‟s decisions to admit 
evidence and to instruct the jury pursuant to the Restatement 
(Third) and not the Restatement (Second) of Torts. We note at 
the outset that the question the Covells present—what is the 
law of Pennsylvania: section 402A of the Restatement 
(Second) of Torts, or sections 1 and 2 of the Restatement 
(Third) of Torts?—is one we laid to rest only 24 months ago 
in Berrier v. Simplicity Manufacturing, Inc., 563 F.3d 38, 40 
(3d Cir. 2009) (holding that if confronted with the question, 
the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania would apply sections 1 
and 2 of the Restatement (Third) of Torts to products liability 
cases), cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 553 (2009). After examining 
the contentions of the parties and the recent decisions of 
Pennsylvania‟s highest court, we conclude that the state of the 
law is no different now than it was when we decided Berrier. 
Rather than exhume the arguments and considerations we laid 
to rest there, we will apply stare decisis. 
 
1. 
 
In past products liability cases, the Supreme Court of 
Pennsylvania has looked to section 402A of the Restatement 
(Second) of Torts. E.g., Webb v. Zern, 220 A.2d 853, 854 
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(Pa. 1966) (“We hereby adopt the foregoing language [of 
§ 402A] as the law of Pennsylvania.”). Section 402A makes 
sellers liable for harm caused to consumers by unreasonably 
dangerous products, even if the seller exercised reasonable 
care: 
 
(1) One who sells any product in a defective 
condition unreasonably dangerous to the 
user or consumer or to his property is 
subject to liability for physical harm thereby 
caused to the ultimate user or consumer, or 
to his property, if 
 
(a) the seller is engaged in the business of 
selling such a product, and 
 
(b) it is expected to and does reach the user 
or consumer without substantial change 
in the condition in which it is sold. 
 
(2) The rule stated in Subsection (1) applies 
although 
 
(a) the seller has exercised all possible care 
in the preparation and sale of his product, 
and 
 
(b) the user or consumer has not bought the 
product from or entered into any 
contractual relation with the seller. 
 
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A (1965). Section 402A 
thus creates a strict liability regime by insulating products 
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liability cases from negligence concepts. See id. 
§ 402A(2)(a); Azzarello v. Black Bros. Co., 391 A.2d 1020, 
1025-1026 (Pa. 1978) (charging courts to avoid negligence 
concepts when instructing a jury pursuant to § 402A.). 
 
During the past 40 years, however, the Supreme Court 
of Pennsylvania has repeatedly addressed confusion arising 
from a core conflict in the structure of section 402A itself: 
Section 402A instructs courts to ignore evidence that the 
seller “exercised all possible care in the preparation and sale 
of his product,” § 402A(2)(a), yet imposes liability only for 
products that are “unreasonably dangerous,” § 402A(1). In 
many cases it is difficult or impossible to determine whether a 
product is “unreasonably dangerous” to consumers without 
reference to evidence that the seller did or did not exercise 
“care in the preparation” of the product. See Schmidt v. 
Boardman Co., 11 A.3d 924, 940 (Pa. 2011) (“This no-
negligence-in-strict-liability rubric has resulted in material 
ambiguities and inconsistency in Pennsylvania‟s 
procedure.”); see also Phillips v. Cricket Lighters, 841 A.2d 
1000, 1015-1016 (Pa. 2003) (Saylor, J., dissenting). 
 
Nonetheless, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania has 
endeavored to segregate strict liability‟s “product-oriented” 
analysis from the “conduct-oriented” analysis of negligence. 
Phillips, 841 A.2d at 1006 (“[W]e have remained steadfast in 
our proclamations that negligence concepts should not be 
imported into strict liability law . . .”). In so doing, 
Pennsylvania‟s high court has stated repeatedly that 
negligence concepts have no place in products liability. E.g., 
id.; Azzarello, 391 A.2d at 1025-1026. That endeavor has not 
always been successful, see Davis v. Berwind Corp., 690 
A.2d 186, 190 (Pa. 1997) (holding that if a “product has 
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reached the user or consumer with substantial change,” 
liability depends upon “whether the manufacturer could have 
reasonably expected or foreseen such an alteration of its 
product.”) (emphasis added), nor has it been uniformly 
embraced by the Justices of that Court, see Schmidt, 11 A.3d 
at 940 (disapproving of Pennsylvania‟s “almost unfathomable 
approach to products litigation”) (quotation omitted). 
The American Law Institute responded to the core 
conflict in section 402A when it published the Restatement 
(Third) of Torts. Sections 1 and 2 of the Restatement (Third) 
of Torts abandon entirely the negligence-versus-strict-liability 
distinction that has caused so much trouble in Pennsylvania: 
 
§ 1:  Liability of Commercial Seller or 
Distributor for Harm Caused by 
Defective Products 
 
One engaged in the business of selling or 
otherwise distributing products who sells 
or distributes a defective product is subject 
to liability for harm to persons or property 
caused by the defect. 
 
§ 2: Categories of Product Defect 
 
A product is defective when, at the time of 
sale or distribution, it contains a 
manufacturing defect, is defective in 
design, or is defective because of 
inadequate instructions or warnings. A 
product: 
 
(a) contains a manufacturing defect when 
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the product departs from its intended 
design even though all possible care 
was exercised in the preparation and 
marketing of the product; 
 
(b) is defective in design when the 
foreseeable risks of harm posed by the 
product could have been reduced or 
avoided by the adoption of a 
reasonable alternative design by the 
seller or other distributor, or a 
predecessor in the commercial chain of 
distribution, and the omission of the 
alternative design renders the product 
not reasonably safe; 
 
(c) is defective because of inadequate 
instructions or warnings when the 
foreseeable risks of harm posed by the 
product could have been reduced or 
avoided by the provision of reasonable 
instructions or warnings by the seller or 
other distributor, or a predecessor in 
the commercial chain of distribution, 
and the omission of the instructions or 
warnings renders the product not 
reasonably safe. 
 
Restatement (Third) of Torts §§ 1-2 (1998). 
 
Section 1 thus makes sellers liable only for the sale of 
products that are “defective,” and section 2 provides that a 
product may qualify as “defective” if it meets one of three 
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sets of criteria. The criteria—which incorporate negligence 
concepts such as “foreseeable risk” and “care” directly into 
the definition of “defective”—amount to an express rejection 
of the “no negligence in products liability” regime that the 
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania has endorsed in cases like 
Azzarello, 391 A.2d at 1025-1026. Several Justices of the 
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania have expressed the view that 
section 402A‟s approach is antiquated and should be 
replaced. See, e.g., Phillips, 841 A.2d at 1015-1016 (Saylor, 
J., Castille, J., & Eakin, J., concurring) (“I believe that the 
time has come for this Court, in the manner of so many other 
jurisdictions, to expressly recognize the essential role of risk-
utility balancing, a concept derived from negligence doctrine, 
in design defect litigation.”). Whether or when that Court will 
move from the Restatement (Second) to the Restatement 
(Third) of Torts are questions that have engendered much 
debate. 
 
They are also questions that have challenged this 
Court. In Berrier, we noted that the Supreme Court of 
Pennsylvania had not yet answered whether bystanders could 
recover on design defect claims. This question, in turn, 
required us to determine whether products liability cases are 
governed by the Restatement (Second) or the Restatement 
(Third) of Torts, and we stated that “[i]n the absence of a 
controlling decision by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, a 
federal court applying that state‟s substantive law must 
predict how Pennsylvania‟s highest court would decide this 
case.” 563 F.3d at 45-46. After reviewing “relevant state 
precedents, analogous decisions, considered dicta, scholarly 
works, and . . . other reliable data,” id. at 46, we concluded 
that “if the Pennsylvania Supreme Court were confronted 
with this issue, it would adopt the Restatement (Third) of 
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Torts, §§ 1 and 2,” id. at 40. Thus, we held that federal courts 
sitting in diversity and applying Pennsylvania law to products 
liability cases should look to sections 1 and 2 of the 
Restatement (Third) of Torts. Id. The precedential holding in 
Berrier, as set forth above, represents this Court‟s view of 
Pennsylvania‟s products liability law. 
 
2. 
 
The District Court followed Berrier. In so doing it 
admitted evidence of the CPSC Standard as relevant to the 
amount of care Bell exercised, and it instructed the jury 
according to the framework set forth in sections 1 and 2 of the 
Restatement (Third) of Torts. The Covells contend that these 
decisions by the District Court were erroneous, because they 
would be improper under section 402A of the Restatement 
(Second) of Torts. They maintain that section 402A “has been 
the law in Pennsylvania since it was adopted in Webb v. Zern, 
[220 A.2d 853 (Pa. 1966)]” and that “[n]o decision of the 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court has changed this.” If the District 
Court had applied the Restatement (Second) of Torts, it 
would not have permitted Bell to admit evidence of the CPSC 
Standard (because due care is irrelevant under the 
Restatement (Second) of Torts), and it would not have 
instructed the jury to consider whether the Giro Monza 
helmet was “unreasonably” dangerous (because the only 
relevant inquiry under the Restatement (Second) of Torts is 
whether the product itself was defective). The Covells 
maintain that each of these decisions by the District Court 
violated the doctrine of Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins, 304 
U.S. 64 (1938), as set forth in Van Dusen v. Barrack, 376 
U.S. 612 (1964), which requires federal courts sitting in 
diversity to apply state substantive law. 376 U.S. at 638 
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(Stating that, “[t]he nub of the policy that underlies [Erie] is 
that . . . a suit by a non-resident litigant in a federal court 
instead of in a State court a block away, should not lead to a 
substantially different result.”). In short, the Covells‟ position 
is that section 402A is the law of Pennsylvania, and that when 
the District Court applied the Restatement (Third) of Torts it 
permitted Bell to illicitly “utilize a transfer to achieve a result 
in federal court which could not have been achieved in the 
courts of the State where the action was filed.” Id. 
 
In response, Bell directs us to our decision in Berrier, 
563 F.3d at 40, wherein we held that if confronted with the 
issue, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania would apply 
sections 1 and 2 of the Restatement (Third) and not section 
402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts. Such predictions 
by a federal court sitting in diversity are permissible absent a 
controlling decision by a state‟s highest court. Nationwide 
Mut. Ins. Co. v. Buffetta, 230 F.3d 634, 637 (3d Cir. 2000). 
Bell‟s position is that the District Court in this case did not 
err, because it followed Berrier‟s precedential prediction of 
Pennsylvania law. 
 
We will affirm the District Court‟s application of 
sections 1 and 2 of the Restatement (Third) of Torts. Much of 
the briefing from the parties, and all of the briefing from the 
amici, is devoted to which Restatement of Torts is best as a 
matter of policy, and which most logically extends the 
decisions of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania—all of 
which are issues we waded through and resolved only two 
years ago when we decided Berrier. This means that, 
notwithstanding the volume of briefing in this case, the 
dispositive question we must answer is straightforward: do 
we follow Berrier? 
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3. 
 
We will follow Berrier, and affirm the District Court. 
First, our Internal Operating Procedures instruct us to follow 
prior panels‟ decisions: 
 
Policy of Avoiding Intra-circuit Conflict of 
Precedent. 
 
It is the tradition of this court that the holding of 
a panel in a precedential opinion is binding on 
subsequent panels. Thus, no subsequent panel 
overrules the holding in a precedential opinion 
of a previous panel. Court en banc consideration 
is required to do so. 
 
3d Cir. I.O.P. 9.1 (2010). 
 
“Although a panel of this court is bound by, and lacks 
authority to overrule, a published decision of a prior panel, a 
panel may reevaluate a precedent in light of intervening 
authority,” including intervening decisions of state law but its 
highest court. Reich v. D.M. Sabia Co., 90 F.3d 854, 858 (3d. 
Cir. 1996) (internal citation omitted). In this vein, the Covells 
direct our attention to Bugosh v. I.U. North America, Inc., 
942 A.2d 897 (Pa. 2008), appeal dismissed as improvidently 
granted by 971 A.2d 1228 (Pa. 2009). The Bugosh petitioner 
had sought a holding from the Supreme Court of 
Pennsylvania declaring that the Restatement (Third) and not 
the Restatement (Second) of Torts reflects the law of 
Pennsylvania. The Court granted allocatur on the issue in 
2008, but in 2009 dismissed the appeal as improvidently 
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granted. Bugosh, 971 A.2d 1228. The Covells urge us to hold 
that the dismissal of Bugosh indicates the Supreme Court of 
Pennsylvania‟s contentment with the Restatement (Second) of 
Torts. 
 
We will not do so. Reading the tea leaves of a 
certiorari or allocatur dismissal is risky business; one could 
just as reasonably conclude that the dismissal here indicates 
the Court‟s approval of Berrier as much as it indicates its 
approval of section 402A. That is why the Supreme Court of 
Pennsylvania has warned against reading between the lines of 
an allocatur dismissal: 
 
In the circumstance where we have accepted an 
issue by granting allowance of appeal, and this 
Court, after conducting our review of the issue, 
enters an order dismissing the appeal as having 
been improvidently granted, the effect is as 
though this Court never granted allowance of 
appeal. In other words, a dismissal as being 
improvidently granted has the exact same effect 
as if this Court had denied the petition for 
allowance of appeal (allocatur) in the first place. 
Where we dismiss an appeal as improvidently 
granted, the lower tribunal‟s opinion and order 
stand as a decision of that court and this Court‟s 
order has no precedential value.  
 
Commonwealth v. Tilghman, 673 A.2d 898, 904 (Pa. 1996) 
(emphasis in original); see also Salazar v. Allstate Ins. Co., 
702 A.2d 1038, 1043 n.10 (Pa. 1997) (“[T]he fact that this 
court denied allowance of appeal . . . is no indication of our 
endorsement of the reasoning used by the Superior Court.”). 
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We therefore conclude that, in light of the Supreme Court of 
Pennsylvania‟s directives in Tilghman and Salazar, the 
Bugosh appeal was an intervening event, but not an 
intervening “authority” sufficient to revisit our holding in 
Berrier. 
 
Given that Bugosh is of no consequence, we conclude 
that the state of the law in Pennsylvania is exactly as it was 
when we decided Berrier. Absent a change in Pennsylvania‟s 
law, we see no reason to upset our precedent. Applying 
Berrier, we hold that the District Court did not err in using the 
Restatement (Third) of Torts to guide its decisions to admit 
evidence, and to frame its jury instructions. 
 
B. 
 
The Covells‟ fallback contention is that even if 
sections 1 and 2 of the Restatement (Third) of Torts were the 
law of Pennsylvania (i.e., even if the jury instructions in this 
case were correct), the District Court nonetheless erred by 
admitting evidence of the CPSC Standard. The Covells point 
out that the CPSC Standard is an “industry regulation” as 
described in section 4 of the Restatement (Third) of Torts, 
which—unlike sections 1 and 2—has not been cited or 
discussed by the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania. Cf. Berrier, 
563 F.3d at 40 (holding only that the Supreme Court of 
Pennsylvania would apply sections 1 and 2 of the 
Restatement (Third) of Torts to products liability cases), The 
Covells maintain that if we affirm the District Court on this 
point we will apply section 4 before the Supreme Court of 
Pennsylvania does so—something to be avoided in a diversity 
case. Cf. Van Dusen, 376 U.S. at 638. We conclude that we 
need break no new ground today; we will affirm the District 
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Court without resort to section 4 of the Restatement (Third) 
of Torts because the CPSC Standard was admissible pursuant 
to section 2. 
 
The Covells are correct that most jurisdictions 
applying the Restatement (Third) of Torts to products liability 
cases hold that evidence of compliance with product 
regulations is admissible to prove whether or not a product is 
defective. E.g., Doyle v. Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft, 
481 S.E.2d 518, 521 (Ga. 1997). Courts in jurisdictions that 
have incorporated the entirety of the Restatement (Third) of 
Torts are free to admit such evidence under section 4, which 
provides: 
 
Noncompliance and Compliance with 
Product Safety Statutes or Regulations 
 
In connection with liability for defective design 
or inadequate instructions or warnings: 
 
(a) a product‟s noncompliance with an 
applicable product safety statute or 
administrative regulation renders the product 
defective with respect to the risk sought to 
be reduced by the statute or regulation; and 
 
(b) a product‟s compliance with an applicable 
product safety standard or administrative 
regulation is properly considered in 
determining whether the product is defective 
with respect to the risks sought to be 
reduced by the statute or regulation, but such 
compliance does not preclude as a matter of 
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law a finding of a product defect. 
 
The District Court admitted such evidence in this case. 
It permitted Bell to demonstrate its compliance with the 
CPSC Standard, 16 C.F.R. § 1203, as evidence that its helmet 
was not “defective,” under section 2 of the Restatement 
(Third) of Torts. 
 
The Covells contend that this was reversible error 
because section 4, not section 2, of the Restatement (Third) of 
Torts deals with governmental regulations, and—setting aside 
all debate over the validity of our holding in Berrier—there 
has been no indication from the Supreme Court of 
Pennsylvania that it would apply section 4. Because section 4 
is not in play, they contend, there was no basis upon which 
the District Court could have admitted evidence of Bell‟s 
compliance with the CPSC Standard, regardless of which 
version of the Restatement it applied. For support, they rely 
upon Lewis v. Coffing Hoist Division, Duff-Norton, Co., 528 
A.2d 590, 594 (Pa. 1987), which applied section 402A and 
held that evidence of industry practice or regulation is 
inadmissible in products liability cases. The Lewis Court 
reasoned that to admit industry practice and regulation in 
products liability cases would be to “improperly [bring] into 
the case concepts of negligence law.” Id. 
 
We are not persuaded. As a threshold matter, we 
believe that to cite to Lewis is to beg the very question at 
issue in this appeal: may district courts applying Pennsylvania 
law to products liability cases admit evidence that is relevant 
to negligence-type concepts, like duty of care or 
forseeability? To rely upon Lewis (handed down in 1987, 
during the zenith of Pennsylvania‟s no-negligence-in-strict-
19 
liability regime) would be to assume the question out of 
existence, because Lewis based its reasoning entirely upon 
the premise that there shall be no negligence in products 
liability. See id. No longer can a court assume that premise is 
true—see Davis, 690 A.2d at 186 (applying certain 
negligence principles to products liability)—which means, by 
extension, that no longer can a court assume Lewis accurately 
reflects the law of Pennsylvania, cf. Aetna Life & Casualty 
Co. v. Barthelemy, 33 F.3d 189, 193 (3d Cir. 1994) (“Where 
stops the reason, there stops the rule.” (quoting Karl N. 
Llewellyn, Jurisprudence: Realism in Theory and Practice 
217 (1962))). 
 
Whether the District Court erred in admitting evidence 
of the CPSC Standard thus depends not on pre-Berrier 
decisions like Lewis, but upon the post-Berrier legal 
framework that controls Pennsylvania products liability cases. 
In our view, it is highly unlikely that the Supreme Court of 
Pennsylvania would apply sections 1 and 2 of the 
Restatement (Third) of Torts (allowing negligence concepts), 
but not section 4 (providing for relevant industry regulation). 
We have difficulty imagining a negligence-friendly products 
liability regime that ignores compliance or non-compliance 
with pertinent state and federal regulations. At any rate, we 
need not determine whether the Supreme Court of 
Pennsylvania would adopt section 4 because we agree with 
Bell that evidence of its compliance with the CPSC Standard 
was relevant to section 2 of the Restatement (Third) of Torts 
as applied in Berrier, and was admissible pursuant to the 
Federal Rules of Evidence. The relevancy provisions of the 
Federal Rules of Evidence control in this case because they 
are “arguably procedural.” See Kelly v. Crown Equip. Co., 
970 F.2d 1273, 1278 (3d Cir. 1992) (Federal Rules of 
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Evidence that are “arguably procedural” control in diversity 
actions, “notwithstanding Pennsylvania law to the contrary.”). 
Under the Federal Rules of Evidence, “„[r]elevant evidence‟ 
means evidence having any tendency to make the existence of 
any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the 
action more probable or less probable than it would be 
without the evidence,” Rule 401, and “[a]ll relevant evidence 
is admissible, except as otherwise provided by the 
Constitution of the United States, by Act of Congress, by 
these rules, or by other rules prescribed by the Supreme Court 
pursuant to statutory authority,” Rule 402. 
 
Applying this standard, we conclude that evidence of 
Bell‟s compliance with the CPSC Standard was relevant to 
the jury‟s inquiry because it went to at least two facts of 
consequence under section 2 of the Restatement (Third) of 
Torts, section 2. First, the CPSC Standard sets forth detailed 
rules for impact resistance and testing, and for labels and 
warning—both on the helmet and its sales packaging. 
Evidence that Bell complied with the CPSC Standard‟s 
requirement for impact resistance testing makes it “more 
probable,” Rule 401, that “all possible care was exercised in 
the preparation and marketing of the product,” Restatement 
(Third) of Torts § 2(a). Second, evidence that Bell complied 
with the CPSC Standard makes it “less probable,” Rule 401, 
that “the foreseeable risks of harm posed by the product could 
have been reduced or avoided by the provision of reasonable 
instructions or warnings,” Restatement (Third) of Torts 
§ 2(c). Of course, such evidence was not conclusive on these 
points, but it was relevant and therefore presumptively 
admissible under the Federal Rules. 
 
Our conclusion in this respect—i.e., that industry 
21 
standards and government regulations are relevant to facts of 
consequence in this case—is also in line with the 
Commentary to section 2 of the Restatement (Third) of Torts. 
Comment (b) explicitly states that industry regulations may 
be relevant to a plaintiff‟s case under section 2, irrespective of 
section 4: 
 
Section 4, dealing with violations of statutory 
and regulatory norms, also provides an alternate 
method of establishing defect. A plaintiff is not 
required to establish the standard for design or 
warning under § 2, but merely to identify a 
government-imposed standard.  
 
Id. § 2 comment (b). Further, comment (d) states that 
defendants may admit evidence of industry practice to show 
that an alternative design would not have made their product 
safer: 
 
The defendant is thus allowed to introduce 
evidence with regard to industry practice that 
bears on whether the omission of an alternative 
design rendered the product not reasonably safe. 
While such evidence is admissible, it is not 
necessarily dispositive. 
 
Id. § 2 comment (d). The commentary to section 2 of the 
Restatement (Third) of Torts thus buttresses our conclusion 
that evidence related to the CPSC Standard was properly 
admitted in this case. 
 
In sum, we conclude that we need not consider 
whether evidence of the CPSC Standard was admissible 
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pursuant to section 4 of the Restatement (Third) of Torts 
because in this case the evidence was admissible pursuant to 
section 2, as applied in Berrier. We will therefore affirm the 
District Court. 
 
* * * * * 
 
We have considered all of the arguments advanced by 
the parties and conclude that no further discussion is 
necessary. The judgment of the District Court will be 
AFFIRMED. 
 
__________ 
 
